



**Global Dialogue  
on AI Governance**

**Overview**

# **Global Dialogue on AI Governance: United Nations & International Telecom Union**

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**AI Policy Labs Brief**

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**AI Policy Labs**

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# Executive Summary

The UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance, convened in Geneva on July 6–7, 2026, was established to address the structural imbalance in global AI development, where compute power and decision-making remain heavily concentrated in the United States, China, and the Global North. Mandated by General Assembly resolution A/RES/79/325 and rooted in the 2024 Global Digital Compact, the Dialogue functioned as an inclusive forum designed to ensure that nations most exposed to AI risks have an equal seat in shaping global governance frameworks.


While the event successfully convened a diverse range of stakeholders, its outcomes prioritized capacity-building and coordination over binding regulatory measures. Concrete initiatives launched during the session include the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, the UN AI Resource Hub, a Global Network for AI Capacity Building, and the Partnerships Hub. Additionally, the Secretary-General secured voluntary pledges regarding renewable energy targets for data centers by 2030 and an AI Child Safety initiative. A second session is confirmed for May 2027 in New York to maintain momentum.

A clear tension emerged throughout the Dialogue between state actors, who prioritized capacity-building and infrastructure development, and civil society, which advocated for urgent, binding safety and human rights safeguards.

Consequently, high-leverage issues such as pre-deployment evaluation standards, cross-border liability, and prohibitions on lethal autonomous weapons remain unresolved, as these measures would require significant concessions from current power holders.

The Dialogue concluded that while the presence of marginalized groups was a positive shift, their long-term influence remains uncertain. Moving forward, the report emphasizes the critical need for genuine co-design rather than one-off consultations. Furthermore, AI Policy Labs (AIPL) underscored the necessity of parliamentary oversight, arguing that legislators must acquire a baseline technical understanding of AI to move beyond reactive policy-making and ensure that governance remains grounded in democratic principles throughout the full system lifecycle.


“Much of the AI conversation is shaped around frontier and hyperscale capability. But a substantial share of real-world deployment sits with smaller and mid-sized firms, and there is value in ensuring more policy reflects that part of the market too.” said Prachetas Bhatnagar, Head of Strategy, Global Affairs, Tony Blair Institute. Added through email interview.



# Abbreviations

| Abbreviation | Meaning                                                          |
|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AIPL         | AI Policy Labs                                                   |
| AI           | Artificial Intelligence                                          |
| UN           | United Nations                                                   |
| GPAI         | Global Partnership on AI                                         |
| UNESCO       | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| ITU          | International Telecommunication Union                            |
| WSIS         | World Summit on the Information Society                          |
| GDP          | Gross Domestic Product                                           |
| DRC          | Democratic Republic of the Congo                                 |
| IEEE         | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers                |
| UNEP         | United Nations Environment Programme                             |
| UNCTAD       | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development               |
| R&D          | Research and Development                                         |
| 5G           | Fifth-generation mobile network                                  |
| EU           | European Union                                                   |
| NIST         | National Institute of Standards and Technology                   |
| CSAM         | Child Sexual Abuse Material                                      |
| KT           | Korea Telecom                                                    |
| SMEs         | Small and Medium-sized Enterprises                               |
| OHCHR        | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  |
| ICRC         | International Committee of the Red Cross                         |
| CCW          | Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons                       |
| ODET         | Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology            |

|        |                                                                |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| G77    | Group of 77                                                    |
| NY     | New York                                                       |
| QNA    | Questions and Answers                                          |
| CPA    | Commonwealth Parliamentary Association                         |
| IPU    | Inter-Parliamentary Union                                      |
| UNDP   | United Nations Development Programme                           |
| UNHCR  | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                  |
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights |
| UNCRC  | United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child           |
| SG     | Secretary-General                                              |
| GA     | General Assembly                                               |



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
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# Chapter 1:

# Introduction

## 1a. What the UN Dialogue is About

“Concentrated commercial and geopolitical interests are largely dictating the speed and direction of the development and deployment of AI.” -Panel Co-Chair Yoshua Bengio.

The past year has seen no shortage of AI governance events, including the AI Action Summit in Paris, the AI Summit in London, the Data + AI Summit in San Francisco, and the World AI Summit in Amsterdam. What has been lacking, however, is geographic diversity within these conversations.

Currently, frontier AI development and computing is dominated by the US and China. At the same time, conversations on AI governance are dominated by the Global North — through national regulations, technical standards, procurement frameworks, and bilateral agreements. While the development and governance of AI is currently dominated by the Global North, the risks and consequences of AI are felt unevenly; the countries most exposed to AI’s consequences have had the least say in how those frameworks are designed. The UN Dialogue was created to ensure that AI governance is shaped by everyone, not just the most technologically advanced regions.

Its purpose is to incorporate the priorities of the Global South and civil society into inclusive AI governance, and correct the current imbalance. Mandated by the UN General Assembly, it gives every government an equal seat; with developing countries and the Global South participating with full standing to shape outcomes — not as observers

## Background

The Global Dialogue originated in the Global Digital Compact, adopted in September 2024 as part of the Pact for the Future, which committed Member States to create an inclusive UN space for AI governance discussions. The General Assembly operationalized that commitment through resolution A/RES/79/325, adopted on 26 August 2025, which established both the Global Dialogue and the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI. The UN's own background materials present these as paired mechanisms, a political forum on one side and a scientific evidence body on the other.

The Dialogue's design is General Assembly-mandated and housed within the United Nations. However, it is not a negotiating forum; its formal output is a co-chairs' summary rather than a declaration or negotiated text. This design lowers the procedural threshold for broad participation, but it also limits the immediate legal weight of anything agreed. The UN's rationale for creating this platform, rather than deferring entirely to existing venues such as the G7 Hiroshima Process, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), the AI Safety Summits, UNESCO, the ITU, or regional regulators, was universality and coherence: a single space where every country, not just the most technologically advanced, has a seat.

The co-chairs described fragmentation and lack of interoperability as the practical problem the Dialogue was created to address. A prior UN press conference had already framed the need for a global approach as one of "networking existing organisation efforts" rather than duplicating them, and of avoiding race-to-the-bottom dynamics between competing regulatory regimes.

The relationship with the Scientific Panel was central to this design. At the 19 June General Assembly briefing, the President of the General Assembly and the co-chairs repeatedly described the Panel as the evidence provider and the Dialogue as the venue where the policy implications of that evidence would be discussed. Maria Ressa told Member States that the Panel's report was written for "the member states and the global dialogue" as its primary audience. Yoshua Bengio stressed that the Panel's role was to provide a rigorous scientific base independent of states, firms, and even the UN itself.

The Dialogue was held the same week as the AI for Good Global Summit and within Geneva Digital Week, alongside WSIS-related events. This clustering raised the overall profile of AI governance that week, encouraged crossover attendance between events, and reinforced Geneva's branding as a multilateral digital governance hub. However, what makes the UN AI Dialogue different, is its ability to convene diverse, academically credible knowledge. In the presentation of the first Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, the UN had gathered 40 global experts serving independent, three-year terms (appointed by the General Assembly).

## 1b. What Happened in the Main Programme

The opening sessions fulfilled four distinct functions: showcasing the Scientific Panel's first report, inviting national and regional positioning, signaling the Secretary-General's preferred priorities, and establishing the UN's claim to legitimacy as the only forum where "every country has a seat at the table". António Guterres argued that AI is advancing "at runaway speed" and that societies are currently subjected to deployment "without a plan, and without consent," a sentiment widely captured in secondary reporting. The official UN Geneva newsroom summary outlined his specific policy agenda: a child safety pledge, non-negotiable human rights red lines, transparency regarding environmental footprints, a shift to renewable-powered data centers by 2030, support for a UN-backed global capacity-building network, recommendations for a Global Fund for AI, and a legal ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems.



The tone of the opening was best captured by Guterres's contrast between "governing by design and drifting by default". Annalena Baerbock's intervention centered on three political pillars: first, that the UN Charter provides the mandate for the organization's involvement in this space; second, that AI harms, such as deepfake abuse against women and girls, are already gendered and intimate; and third, that inclusion is both an ethical and strategic imperative, warning that digital and AI divides will widen if governance and capacity remain concentrated in a few capitals and boardrooms.

The co-chairs of the Scientific Panel established the relationship between evidence and politics. Maria Ressa emphasized that the Panel is "not a summit" or communiqué-issuing body, but a standing entity accountable to evidence. Yoshua Bengio argued that intelligence confers power, that the concentration of this power is a core risk, and that the rapid pace of AI development leaves states with little time to make consequential decisions. Their contribution provided the Dialogue with a vital shared baseline: risks are not merely speculative, and concerns regarding concentration, information integrity, and catastrophic harm have now formally entered the UN evidence chain.

While areas of agreement in the opening were broad, acknowledging that AI’s opportunities are real, its risks are transnational, no single entity can govern it alone, and developing countries require significantly more capacity, areas of tension remained subtler

The Secretary-General used the opening to raise concerns about “killer robots,” yet the Dialogue’s formal scope remained limited to civilian AI. This highlighted a recurring ambiguity: civilian governance mechanisms are increasingly difficult to isolate from military spillovers.

1c. Who Participated

The dialogue successfully met its target of creating a space for global perspectives, with the majority of submissions coming from Asia and the Pacific (29%), followed by Western Europe (28%) and Africa (25%). However, participants from the Global Majority highlighted how visa requirements and travel expenses to get to Geneva posed a barrier to smaller labs and groups. For example, a notable AI worker, Freedom Wangi, was unable to take part due to visa issues.

Additionally, the UN Dialogue boasted a diversity of knowledge backgrounds, not just geographies. With the majority of submissions coming from civil society groups, marginalised voices were invited to shape the discussion. For example, panelists noted how young people are the main users of AI, but not the decision makers.

Organisations such as 5Rights, UNICEF and other global youth voices were able to shape the discussion, promoting initiatives such as the UNCRC General comment No.25, which establishes that children’s rights apply fully and equally in the digital environment. The 5Rights Foundation further highlighted concrete expectations for states and tech companies, concluding that “AI systems which are not rigorously tested before deployment to be safe or designed to respect children’s rights must never interact with or impact children”.

Figure 1: Submissions by Stakeholder Categories





Figure 2: Submissions by UN Regional Groups

SUBMISSIONS BY UN REGIONAL GROUP

Source: [un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance](https://un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance).



An additional 468 submissions came from internationally-oriented organisations or did not specify a UN regional group.

# Chapter 2: Agenda

## 2a. Agenda Overview

The Global AI Dialogue was structured around four interconnected thematic clusters (see Table 1). The Dialogue placed four quite different kinds of issues—understanding AI’s effects, distributing access and resources, coordinating regulation and protecting rights—within a single framework. Treating them as equal allowed governments to support the overall framework without stating which objectives should take precedence when they conflicted. Yet, the framework was broad enough to secure agreement but not sufficiently ordered to guide actual prioritization.

The language on human rights and regulatory interoperability accommodated substantially different national approaches, including China’s state-centred governance model and India’s content-removal rules. The agreement was therefore stronger at the level of terminology than at the level of policy, strategically leaving room for varied policymaking styles.

Table 1: Agenda Clusters and Scope

| Cluster                                                        | Scope                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AI opportunities and implications                              | Social, economic, ethical, cultural, linguistic and technical dimensions of AI.                                                        |
| Bridging AI divides                                            | Capacity-building, access, digital foundations, open-source software, open data, open AI models and high-performance computing skills. |
| Safe, secure and trustworthy AI                                | Safe and secure AI systems, interoperability and compatibility of governance approaches.                                               |
| Human rights, transparency, accountability and human oversight | International law compliance, rights protection, transparency, accountability and robust human oversight.                              |

The reference to “interoperable governance approaches” in the third cluster was particularly significant. Although interoperability sounds technical, its use reflected a political recognition that countries were unlikely to agree on a single global regulatory system for AI.

The more realistic objective was therefore to make different national systems capable of interacting with, or at least understanding, one another. This was closer to regulatory compatibility or mutual recognition than to the creation of common binding rules. Co-chair Rein Tammsaar’s description of the meeting as a “Dialogue of the dialogues” reinforced this interpretation. The Dialogue was intended to coordinate an already fragmented set of national and international processes, rather than replace them with a new global authority.

Given that the General Assembly resolution did not create binding obligations or enforcement powers, this was a practical approach. However, the term “interoperability” should not be confused with substantive regulatory convergence. Countries could make their systems more legible to one another while continuing to disagree on the underlying rules.

The fourth cluster—human rights, transparency, accountability and human oversight—contained the widest range of possible interpretations. Governments could agree with these principles while applying them in substantially different, and sometimes conflicting, ways.

China’s Global AI Governance Action Plan referred to safety and the public good, while China’s domestic regulatory system also required AI-generated content to conform to core socialist values and restricted content considered threatening to state authority. India’s three-hour content-removal requirement, meanwhile, did not adequately distinguish between political satire, journalism and genuinely harmful material. Both approaches could be presented domestically as measures supporting safe or trustworthy AI.

This differed significantly from the proportionality-based approach advanced through UNESCO’s human rights framework, under which restrictions on expression should be necessary, proportionate and subject to safeguards. Agreement on general terms such as “trustworthiness” and “human rights” therefore did not mean that countries had agreed on how these principles should be applied.

The gap between the Dialogue’s scientific and diplomatic tracks was even more revealing. Shortly before the meeting, the Independent International Scientific Panel—comprising 40 experts and co-chaired by Yoshua Bengio and Maria Ressa—concluded that existing scientific evidence could not rule out catastrophic harm from frontier AI systems. This was a notably strong warning from a UN-convened scientific body.

The diplomatic framework, however, remained framed around broadly acceptable concepts such as opportunities, divides, trustworthiness and oversight. The scientific track described the possible severity of the risks, while the political track produced language that allowed governments with very different interests and regulatory systems to remain within the same process.

The four clusters therefore showed the present limits of international agreement: countries were prepared to discuss the full range of AI governance questions, but had not yet agreed on how the costs and trade-offs involved should be distributed.

## 2b. Key Challenges Identified in the Global AI Dialogue 2026

### *Thematic 1: AI Opportunities and Implications (Social, Economic, Cultural/Linguistic, Technical, Environmental)*

#### **1. Concentration of Compute and Value Capture**

Costa Rica noted that Latin America and the Caribbean hold 6.6 percent of global GDP and 8.8 percent of world population but receive only 1.12 percent of global AI investment, with over 90 percent of regional high-performance computing concentrated in a single country. Derechos Digitales argued that a handful of companies and countries drive AI's economic interests and shape governance to protect those same interests, while Smart Africa warned that the real risk for developing regions is not moving too slowly, but remaining spectators while others capture the value AI creates.

#### **2. Access Is Not the Same as Capacity**

Costa Rica described this gap as one of "technological agency," not ambition, noting that of 19 Latin American countries with national AI strategies, only a few have budgets, implementation plans, or impact indicators. The DRC and Iran separately warned that developing countries risk being reduced to a market, data source, or testing ground rather than genuine co-creators.

#### **3. Linguistic Exclusion**

Google noted that nearly half of major AI models' training data is in English, though English represents only about 20 percent of the world's spoken languages. Sri Lanka added that market forces alone will always favor the world's largest languages, leaving several hundred languages and dialects underserved.

#### **4. Cultural Exclusion Beyond Language**

Sri Lanka argued that AI which "speaks" a language but does not understand local value systems, traditions, or legal norms cannot give trusted or relevant advice, while Estonia raised concern that smaller nations risk losing their own languages as younger generations default to dominant languages online.

#### **5. Unmeasured Environmental Footprint**

Alibaba Cloud noted that no standardized methodology exists yet for measuring AI's energy and water use, or even for basic units like a "token," a gap echoed by IEEE and UNEP regarding lifecycle measurement of energy, water, materials, and e-waste.

#### **7. Manipulative Design as a Business Model Feature**

Derechos Digitales stated that manipulative design combines social engineering with technology, driven by data and attention based revenue models, making self-regulation insufficient. As evidence, up to 99 percent of deepfakes and synthetic sexual imagery target women, and a review of 100+ freely available apps found 70 percent used sexually suggestive or nude imagery of women in their own promotional material as a deliberate design choice.

#### **8. Governance-at-Deployment Gap**

The Council on Foreign Relations described current governance architecture as oriented almost entirely toward the pre-release question of "is it safe to deploy," rarely addressing whether people later affected, in a clinic, benefits office, or classroom, have any means to contest or seek remedy, calling this "traceability without recourse."

#### **9. Sovereignty vs. Interoperability Tension**

The UN Data Governance Working Group warned that overly restrictive data localization risks fragmenting the datasets AI training depends on, while Russia's delegate framed excessive centralization of AI development among a narrow group of states and companies as a form of "digital neo-colonialism" to be guarded against.

### 10. Just Transition and Labour Disruption

AI Singapore warned against repeating the mistakes of earlier globalization, where sound economic theory was undermined by poor calibration of distribution and transition. The Philippines flagged that AI displacement and skill gaps hit workers, children, persons with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, creators, and small enterprises hardest, and called for protecting creative works and traditional knowledge from being treated merely as AI training material.

### 11. Fragmentation vs. Sovereignty in Regulation

Cote d'Ivoire warned against repeating the mistake of early telecom-era regulatory fragmentation, where incompatible national approaches delayed market development.

### 12. Security Vulnerability of Civilian AI Infrastructure

Iran's delegate cited an incident affecting Sharif University of Technology as evidence of the risks posed by inadequate governance and deterrence frameworks around AI and scientific infrastructure.



## *Thematic 2: Bridging AI Divides (Capacity-Building, Access, Digital Foundations)*

### **1. Concentrated Investment**

UNCTAD's Acting Secretary-General noted close to 800 billion dollars will be spent on AI infrastructure this year alone, heading toward 8 trillion dollars cumulatively by decade's end, yet two economies host the majority of it and just 100 companies account for 40 percent of global corporate R&D, with least developed countries capturing only about 10 percent of strategic-sector investment relative to their share elsewhere.

### **2. Connectivity Is Not Access**

Lesotho's Deputy Minister cited 100 percent national connectivity coverage but only 50 percent actual internet usage, with many still walking long distances to charge phones. El Salvador described its own rural laptop rollout failing until targeted fixes, first white-space routers, then satellite connectivity, were applied.

### **3. Data Fragmentation as the Core Barrier**

Lesotho identified fragmented, unstructured public sector data, rather than compute access, as the primary barrier to AI adoption.

### **4. Linguistic Exclusion at Scale**

A UN Permanent Forum speaker, citing the Scientific Panel's preliminary report, noted only 1,000 of the world's roughly 7,000 languages have the foundations needed for meaningful AI inclusion, disproportionately excluding Indigenous communities, with the performance gap not narrowing despite rapid AI advancement.

### **5. The "Pipeline" Framing of Capacity-Building Is Incomplete**

A Philippines-based practitioner (Smart City) identified three deeper gaps beyond training itself: absorption, meaning no job or budget destination for trained staff; no seat at governance tables; and no ownership of underlying compute or data assets, reframing the AI divide as fundamentally "a power and access problem."

### **6. The Oversight and Evaluation Gap**

The Digital Futures Lab founder identified chronic underinvestment by governments, funders, and development agencies in evaluation capacity, procurement standards, incident reporting, and monitoring in the Global South, at both state and civil-society levels, forcing reliance on frameworks imported from the Global North.

### **7. Dependency vs. Sovereignty**

Algeria's minister stated only two countries are currently positioned to build or shape frontier AI, calling the resulting arrangement "dependency," not "inclusion." Brazil's Ambassador reframed digital sovereignty as reducing structural dependency over time rather than achieving full self-sufficiency, while the Digital Futures Lab countered that the real issue is whether countries have agency to manage dependency on their own terms.

### **8. Brain Drain vs. Brain Circulation**

A researcher from the University of Pretoria and African Institute for Data Science and AI raised the challenge of shifting from "brain drain" to "brain circulation," where emigrating talent still contributes back to home-region capacity, alongside the need for local private-sector R&D investment.

### **9. Unsustainable Capacity-Building**

Bangladesh's delegate stated plainly that "access without capacity creates dependency, capacity without local ownership does not survive project cycle," a point echoed by Algeria's minister, who noted past programs often produced one-off training reports with no lasting sustainability.

### **10. Absence of a Dedicated Financing Mechanism**

Nepal, Botswana, and Bangladesh each called for a dedicated Global Fund on AI to pool resources for least-developed and developing countries, citing the absence of any concrete financing mechanism as a structural gap.

### **11. Fragmentation of Global Governance Tracks**

Brazil's Ambassador flagged that the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit process, from Bletchley to Seoul to Paris to New Delhi, next in Switzerland in 2027, has no formal connection to the UN Global Dialogue, risking duplicated governance tracks.

### **12. Institutional Readiness Gaps**

INTERPOL noted that AI literacy and governance readiness vary considerably across law enforcement agencies worldwide, framing this as both a technology access and institutional trust challenge.

### *Thematic 3: Bridging AI Divides (Capacity-Building, Access, Digital Foundations)*

#### **1. Extreme Concentration of Model Production and Compute**

Costa Rica cited the Scientific Panel's finding that in 2025 the US produced 59 notable AI models and China 35, while the rest of the world combined produced only 13, with the US holding about 75 percent of computing power among the top 500 known AI clusters, arguing this means "concentration of infrastructure becomes concentration of evidence," since the same actors decide which risks and benchmarks get evaluated.

#### **2. Infrastructure Disparity Undermines Universal Governance Assumptions**

Costa Rica cited 5G coverage at 70 percent of the population in Asia-Pacific versus only 12 percent in Africa, and noted Africa attracted just 3 percent of global data center investment in 2024, warning that governance models assuming universal technical capacity will reproduce inequality.

#### **3. Incompatible Regulatory Definitions**

The UAE's delegate explained that "high-risk AI" is defined by use case under the EU AI Act, addressed sectorally or voluntarily in the US, and handled through registration or labeling elsewhere, meaning a single model can simultaneously be high-risk, lightly regulated, and requiring state filing across different jurisdictions.

#### **4. No Shared Incident-Reporting Infrastructure**

The UAE and the Center for Responsible AI both stressed the absence of a shared, legally binding incident-reporting system, meaning a safety failure in one country has no guaranteed channel to reach regulators elsewhere before the same failure recurs.

#### **5. The Evidence Dilemma**

The UN AI Panel noted that AI capability roughly doubles every few months, meaning real-world harm evidence is often outdated by the time it is compiled, and that more than 40 documented governance frameworks exist but remain fragmented and rarely tested against real-world effectiveness, largely evaluated by the same companies developing the systems.

#### **6. Agentic AI Raises the Governance Bar**

UN Special Envoy Amandeep Singh Gill described a shift from static model oversight to dynamic system governance, requiring verifiable agent identity, traceable delegation, machine-readable permissions, and effective revocation, none of which are yet standardized, while the International AI Safety Report noted there is no scientific guarantee that autonomous agents reliably follow instructions.

#### **7. Structural Consequences of Fragmentation**

The UN Special Envoy named four concrete consequences: regulatory arbitrage as developers relocate to weaker jurisdictions, accountability gaps across global value chains, a disproportionate compliance burden on SMEs and low-income-country developers, and deepened dependency for lower-capacity states forced to align with dominant frameworks.

#### **8. Linguistic Exclusion in Safety Evaluation**

Latvia noted the gap between dominant and underrepresented languages in leading AI models is widening, and that using AI in smaller languages can cost several times more in computational tokens, while Dr. Joy Buolamwini of the Algorithmic Justice League found that less than 5 percent of some "gold standard" NIST benchmarks represented the Global South or people with dark skin.

#### **9. Information Integrity as a Systemic Safety Risk**

WITNESS argued that AI's erosion of a shared sense of reality, through deepfakes and the "liar's dividend," is a systemic cross-border safety risk, finding through its own testing that detection tools work least well for those most at risk, particularly in the Global South. Latvia separately reported filtering out millions of articles from a coordinated disinformation network that had infiltrated global AI training data.

### **10. Mental Health Risks from Deployed Systems**

The UN AI Panel highlighted that weak safety baselines combined with sycophantic chatbot behaviour are affecting mental health globally, alongside rising incidence of AI-generated child sexual abuse material and deepfake-enabled sexual violence disproportionately affecting the Global South, women, and children.

### **11. Harmonization vs. Sovereignty Tension**


Costa Rica, Brazil, the UAE, Pakistan, and South Africa all warned that interoperability must not become forced regulatory uniformity or a lowest-common-denominator outcome, with Pakistan specifically warning that safety norms are too often set by a small number of states and firms, producing standards "exported rather than shared."

### **12. Verification Asymmetry**

Pakistan and Bangladesh, along with several UN Resident Coordinators, stressed that a nation cannot trust what it cannot independently assess, yet testing and assurance capacity remains concentrated where the technology itself is built.

### **13. Access Barriers to the Dialogue Itself**

A speaker from the Center for Responsible AI noted she was presenting in place of a colleague who could not obtain a visa in time to attend, offering as live evidence of the access asymmetry under discussion.



#### *Thematic 4: Bridging AI Divides (Capacity-Building, Access, Digital Foundations)*

##### **1. Regulatory Lag Behind Deployment Speed**

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk compared AI's rollout to the 10 to 15 years of clinical trials a new drug undergoes before reaching market, warning that AI is being developed and deployed "at warp speed" without equivalent safeguards, fueling mass surveillance, disinformation, gender bias, and harm to children.

##### **2. Gendered Harms and Discrimination**

UN Women's Executive Director Sima Bahous presented that 44 percent of assessed AI systems demonstrate gender bias, almost 1 in 4 surveyed women human rights defenders and journalists had experienced AI-assisted online violence, up to 99 percent of online deepfakes target women, and only 24 of 138 countries reference gender in national AI strategies, calling for mandatory human rights impact assessments with gender equality treated as non-negotiable.

##### **3. Children's Safety Failures**

Scientific Panel member Sonia Livingstone reported that across 11 Global South countries, up to one child per classroom had experienced AI-generated sexually explicit deepfakes of themselves, that reports of AI-generated CSAM are rising exponentially, and that Stanford's risk assessment of AI companion products found they fail basic safety standards despite 1 in 3 US children having discussed serious emotional matters with one.

##### **4. Endogenous and Cognitive Harms**

Morocco's Minister Delegate Amal El Fallah Seghrouchni distinguished exogenous harms, which are external and measurable, from endogenous harms, which occur within the human mind and are imperceptible, such as algorithmic manipulation of a child's psychology, referencing Chile's early legislative attempt to introduce cognitive rights.

##### **5. Agentic AI Accountability Gap**

El Fallah Seghrouchni called accountability in agentic AI "probably the most significant legal challenge of the decade," illustrating the problem with Morocco's Iderati X.O platform, which processes 52 million daily transactions, and proposed structured documentation of agent chains, an identifiable human in charge for public-service deployments, and a right to timely redress. KT's Vice President Wanjin Park added that when multi-agent systems from different companies interconnect, each applies its own definition of risk, undermining any single firm's due diligence.

##### **6. Structurally Uneven Human Rights Due Diligence**

Nighat Dad of the Digital Rights Foundation argued that due diligence as most companies practice it does not meet the UN Guiding Principles standard, calling the concentration of meaningful assessments in the EU, while the same systems deploy elsewhere unchecked, a "structural choice, not a capacity gap," creating a "two-tier rights regime," and documented over 23,000 cases of technology-facilitated abuse via her organization's helpline.

##### **7. Evaluation Mismatch and Evidence Gaps**

Scientific Panel member Alvitta Ottley identified an "evaluation mismatch" between engineering metrics like speed and accuracy and societal questions like accountability and trust, alongside an "evidence gap," since there is abundant data on model performance but very little on how AI affects children's learning, clinical decisions, or human decision-making generally.

##### **8. Concentration of Power**

Jhalak Kakkar of the Centre for Communication Governance at the National Law University of Delhi argued that without diffusing the concentration of power in a handful of companies and jurisdictions, human rights, especially for people in the Global South, cannot be safeguarded, flagging the transnational governance gap between national laws and global companies.

##### **9. Environmental Transparency as a Human Rights Issues**

Sasha Luccioni of the Sustainable AI Group argued that transparency about AI's environmental footprint is a fundamental right enabling informed choice, noting that even the IEA struggles to obtain this data because member countries themselves often lack it, and proposed her AI Energy Score Project as a step toward informed decision-making.

##### **10. Creator, Journalist, and Intellectual Property Rights**

Universal Music Group's Robert Baruch grounded the industry's position in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15 of the ICESCR, proposing creator control, transparency, and human oversight as three pillars, while Brazil's Joao Brant raised concern about AI's impact on journalism's economic sustainability given content scraped without consent or credit.

### 11. Exclusion from Governance Processes


Co-chair Linda Bonyo noted that 51 percent of AI governance conversations happen in Geneva, effectively locking out the rest of the world due to visa barriers shaped by opaque algorithms, naming a specific absent participant, an AI worker unable to obtain a visa, as concrete evidence.

### 12. Barriers Facing Displaced and Stateless Populations

UNHCR's Elizabeth Tan cited documentation gaps, language barriers, digital access limitations, and fear of authorities as compounding barriers for displaced people, citing AI-generated content inciting hostility against refugees in Libya and continued dehumanizing narratives targeting the Rohingya community.

### 13. Principle-Implementation Gap

Session moderator Clara Chappaz and panelist Nighat Dad both concluded that the geographic unevenness of due diligence reflects structural choices, not capacity limits, warning that without addressing this, communities will either withdraw from digital spaces or build their own governance-free alternatives, a concern reinforced by the session's own audience survey, which found a plurality of participants believed insufficient governance measures are currently in place.



**Table 2: Agenda Items Ranked by leverage**

| A - Opportunities |                                                                     | B - Bridging divides                                                                                                                                                                                | C - Safe & trustworthy                                                          | D - Rights & oversight                                                            | X - Cross-cutting                                                                                                                                                            |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Rank              | Agenda / challenge                                                  | Sub-agenda                                                                                                                                                                                          | Who cares                                                                       | Leverage                                                                          | Proposed solution                                                                                                                                                            |
| 1<br>X            | <b>Institutional architecture &amp; science-policy interface</b>    | Shared evidence baseline; risk taxonomies and indicators; connecting (not duplicating) initiatives; partnership hub; follow-through to New York 2027; a Global Fund for AI.                         | Co-chairs; Special Envoy Gill; ITU, UNESCO, ODET, G77.                          | ●●● 11<br><u>connective</u> forum, progress spreads to every item.                | <b>[Launched]</b> Scientific Panel and first report; Partnerships Hub; NY 2027. <b>[Proposed]</b> Global Fund for AI.                                                        |
| 2<br>C            | <b>Frontier AI safety, evaluation &amp; liability</b>               | Catastrophic-harm risk; deceptive, evaluation-aware models; evaluation baselines and third-party testing; whole-lifecycle safeguards; incident reporting; cross-border liability.                   | Scientific Panel; EU; Costa Rica; safety researchers.                           | ●●● 10<br><u>feeds</u> evaluation, liability, cyber, weapons, child safety.       | <b>[Called for]</b> evidence-based lifecycle safeguards; evaluation baselines; incident sharing; liability rules.                                                            |
| 3<br>D            | <b>Human rights, transparency, accountability &amp; oversight</b>   | Privacy, due process, non-discrimination; human oversight; transparency and redress; rights as obligations and red lines; lifecycle accountability; affected-community voice.                       | UNESCO; OHCHR; UN Women; civil society; EU.                                     | ●●● 10<br>cross-cuts deployment, information, child safety, use of force.         | <b>[Called for]</b> rights as enforceable obligations and red lines; independent audits; complaint and remedy channels.                                                      |
| 4<br>B            | <b>Bridging the AI divide: capacity, access &amp; skills</b>        | Compute, energy and connectivity; skills and teacher training; oversight and evaluation capacity; procurement readiness; adoption gap (27% North / 15% South); create and govern, not just consume. | Developing countries / Global South; co-chairs; Microsoft; Smart Africa.        | ●●● 7<br><u>gates who</u> <u>benefits from</u> and <u>governs</u> AI.             | <b>[Launched]</b> Global Network for AI Capacity Building; UN AI Resource Hub; Partnerships Hub. <b>[Called for]</b> evaluations, procurement standards, incident reporting. |
| 5<br>C            | <b>Cybersecurity of AI systems</b>                                  | Model theft via mass querying; training-data poisoning; hidden-behaviour attacks; AI-automated cyberattacks; securing models and pipelines.                                                         | Security experts; national-security states; industry.                           | ●●● 7<br><u>bridges</u> safety, rights, information, child safety, weapons.       | <b>[Called for]</b> model and pipeline security standards; anti-poisoning and anti-theft measures; incident sharing.                                                         |
| 6<br>D            | <b>Information integrity, deepfakes &amp; democratic resilience</b> | Synthetic media and deepfakes; sexual deepfakes (99%: 96% target women and girls); persuasion at scale; election integrity; provenance and media literacy.                                          | Maria Ressa; GA President Baerbock; journalists; UN Women.                      | ●●○ 6<br>meeting point of safety, rights, child safety, security.                 | <b>[Called for]</b> content provenance and authenticity standards; platform accountability; election-period safeguards.                                                      |
| 7<br>C            | <b>Interoperability &amp; avoiding fragmentation</b>                | Divergent laws, codes and certification; mutual recognition; shared standards and evidence; regulatory sandboxes; compliance costs; regulatory arbitrage.                                           | EU; Costa Rica; Microsoft; standards bodies (ISO/IEC, OECD).                    | ●●○ 6<br><u>decides</u> <u>whether</u> measures scale across borders or fragment. | <b>[Called for]</b> minimum compatibility; shared incident-reporting formats; mutual recognition; regulator networks.                                                        |
| 8<br>A            | <b>AI opportunity &amp; benefit-sharing</b>                         | Development, health, science and productivity gains; AI as a “great equalizer”; equitable <u>benefit-sharing</u> ; locked-in access; outcomes over hype.                                            | UN SG; developing countries; Smart Africa; Google; industry.                    | ●●○ 6<br>benefit depends on divide, openness, safety, institutions.               | <b>[Called for]</b> benefit-sharing; locked-in access; focus on jobs, health, education. <b>[Showcased via]</b> Partnerships Hub.                                            |
| 9<br>B            | <b>Openness &amp; multilingual inclusion</b>                        | Open-source software, open data and open models (4(g)); low-resource-language models; cultural adaptation; local datasets; AI as a public good.                                                     | Developing countries; open-source community; UNESCO; Google Research; academia. | ●●○ 6<br><u>practical route</u> to <u>bridge</u> the divide and widen benefit.    | <b>[Called for]</b> open models and data; multilingual, culturally adapted models; funding for low-resource languages. <b>[Supported by]</b> UN AI Resource Hub.             |

|                |                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                |                                                                      |                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>10</b><br>D | <b>Child safety, gendered harm &amp; online abuse</b>          | Child sexual abuse material; unsafe AI companions; grooming and manipulation; age-appropriate design; rapid takedown and reporting; children's voice in design.                  | UN SG; GA President; UNICEF-linked bodies; child-rights advocates.             | ●●○ 5<br>focused network on safety, rights, information harms.       | <b>[Proposed]</b> AI Child Safety Pledge. <b>[Called for]</b> child-risk assessments; rapid takedown; survivor-centred remedies. |
| <b>11</b><br>D | <b>Military &amp; autonomous weapons: peace &amp; security</b> | Lethal autonomous weapons ("killer robots"); civilian chips to the battlefield; meaningful human control over force; a ban under international law; humanitarian-law compliance. | UN SG; disarmament and humanitarian community; peace-focused states; ICRC/CCW. | ●●○ 5<br>distinct security track linked to safety, oversight, cyber. | <b>[Called for]</b> meaningful human control; ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons. No instrument agreed.                      |
| <b>12</b><br>A | <b>Environmental sustainability of AI</b>                      | Data-centre energy, water and materials; carbon intensity of compute; footprint disclosure; renewable-powered compute by 2030; e-waste and hardware supply chains.               | UN SG; UNEP; environmental groups; energy-constrained states.                  | ●○○ 3<br>low centrality, but a physical precondition for compute.    | <b>[Proposed]</b> renewables by 2030; footprint disclosure. <b>[Called for]</b> green procurement and efficiency standards.      |

**Note:** UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance- agenda items ranked by leverage. Leverage defined as the number of other agenda items each connects to. Ties are broken by how often the item surfaced in the record. Colour marks the thematic cluster (A–D and cross-cutting), independent of rank. Solution tags: Launched = set up at the event; Proposed = a pledge or target; Called for = urged but not agreed. Sub-agendas and solutions draw on the four thematic breakout sessions (ITU report) and plenary statements.

## 2c. Key Solutions Discussed at the AI Dialogue

- **Geneva produced three launched initiatives, all of them about capacity and coordination:**

1. The Independent Scientific Panel and its first report.
  2. The UN AI Resource Hub with fellowships.
  3. Global Network for AI Capacity Building, backed by over twenty states.
- The Partnerships Hub, a registry where anyone can log an initiative, was also launched.
  - The Secretary-General put two pledges on the table, an AI Child Safety Pledge and renewable-powered data centres by 2030.
  - Other high-impact solutions were urged but not acted upon. For example, pre-deployment evaluation standards, incident reporting, cross-border liability, provenance rules, mutual recognition, cybersecurity standards, and limits on autonomous weapons, were discussed but not agreed upon.

It is worth mentioning that while some of these areas carry the highest AI risks (e.g. autonomous weapons), they also carry the most difficult trade-offs and concessions, making them unlikely to be met in the absence of a legally binding authority. This observation is supported by the written submissions. Governments were the only stakeholder group to place capacity-building first; most other groups ranked safety first. Capacity-building is therefore aligned with state objectives, requires no constraint on others, and transfers money and skills. Safety measures, on the other hand, do the opposite, which may be why they did not progress.

- **Three measures had only been proposed with no implementation initiatives tied with them yet:**

1. A child-safety pledge
2. Renewable-powered AI data centres by 2030
3. Guaranteed AI access for developing countries.

Each addressed an important issue, but lacked clear definitions, implementation mechanisms or reporting requirements.

- **Eight higher-stakes measures remained unagreed, including:**

1. Open models as public goods.
2. Limits on autonomous weapons.
3. Content-provenance standards.
4. Shared cybersecurity rules.
5. Incident reporting.
6. Cross-border liability.
7. Interoperable governance.
8. Pre-deployment evaluation of frontier models.

The broader pattern was that the Dialogue had made the greatest progress on measures involving coordination, research and future meetings. Measures capable of directly changing developer incentives or state behaviour—particularly liability rules, mandatory evaluations and cross-border regulatory standards—remained unresolved.

In effect, the institutional architecture had begun to take shape, while the rules carrying the greatest practical consequences had yet to secure political agreement.

**Table 3: Proposed Solutions Ranked by Impact & Progress Status**

| LAUNCHED       | PROPOSED                                                             | NOT YET AGREED                                                       |        |                                                                                                       |                                                                         |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Status         | Solution                                                             | Proposed by                                                          | Impact | Impact justification                                                                                  | Where it stands                                                         |
| LAUNCHED       | AI Dialogue Partnerships Hub                                         | Dialogue Joint Secretariat (ITU, UNESCO, ODET)                       | 2      | Voluntary registry of initiatives, carries no commitment.                                             | Live through 2027; entries voluntary.                                   |
| LAUNCHED       | UN AI Resource Hub (capacity, fellowships)                           | Dialogue Joint Secretariat                                           | 2      | No standards attached.                                                                                | Launched Day 2.                                                         |
| LAUNCHED       | Second session, New York, May 2027                                   | UN GA Res. A/RES/79/325; co-chairs López and Tammsaar                | 3      | Dates every deferred item and forces a reporting moment.                                              | Fixed; converts deferred items into a schedule.                         |
| LAUNCHED       | Global Network for AI Capacity Building (20+ states)                 | UN Secretary-General                                                 | 3      | Coordination at scale on governments' own top-ranked priority; touches divide, opportunity, openness. | Distributes effort rather than changing behaviour.                      |
| PROPOSED       | AI Child Safety Pledge for member states                             | UN Secretary-General                                                 | 3      | Harms are cross-border and undeniable, but reach is confined to one agenda item.                      | Voluntary; rides existing national CSAM enforcement.                    |
| PROPOSED       | Renewable-powered AI data centres by 2030                            | UN Secretary-General                                                 | 3      | A dated target on a hard physical constraint for compute expansion.                                   | No mechanism, reporting or consequence.                                 |
| NOT YET AGREED | Open models, open data & multilingual models as public goods         | Mandate 4(g); developing countries; UNESCO; Google Research (Matias) | 3      | Practical route to bridge the divide and widen benefit; shapes safety and rights indirectly.          | Broad support, no opposition, no mechanism or funding attached.         |
| NOT YET AGREED | Meaningful human control & limits on lethal autonomous weapons       | UN Secretary-General; disarmament community                          | 4      | Existential stakes for civilians; reaches safety, rights and oversight.                               | The CCW is the negotiating venue; the Dialogue has no mandate.          |
| PROPOSED       | Locked-in access to AI for developing countries                      | UN Secretary-General                                                 | 4      | Would reshape divide, opportunity and openness simultaneously if given specific content.              | No definition of what locked-in access means in practice.               |
| NOT YET AGREED | Content provenance & authenticity standards; platform accountability | Civil society (Maria Ressa); GA President Baerbock                   | 4      | Addresses the harm with the clearest public salience; touches rights, child safety and elections.     | Available, but carries a free-expression risk Geneva did not address.   |
| NOT YET AGREED | Content provenance & authenticity standards; platform accountability | Civil society (Maria Ressa); GA President Baerbock                   | 4      | Addresses the harm with the clearest public salience; touches rights, child safety and elections.     | Available, but carries a free-expression risk Geneva did not address.   |
| NOT YET AGREED | Shared cybersecurity standards (model theft, data poisoning)         | Technical and security experts; industry                             | 4      | Bridges safety, rights, information integrity, child safety and weapons.                              | No political opposition; currently unowned.                             |
| NOT YET AGREED | Incident & near-miss sharing mechanism                               | UN Secretary-General; EU; Scientific Panel                           | 4      | Fastest route to a common picture of real-world failure; feeds evaluation and liability.              | Technical, low cost, threatens no market position.                      |
| LAUNCHED       | Independent Scientific Panel & first report (1 July)                 | UN GA Res. A/RES/79/325; co-chaired by Bengio and Ressa              | 4      | Sets the shared evidence baseline the safety, liability and interoperability arguments run on.        | Built and running; influences rather than binds.                        |
| NOT YET AGREED | Cross-border liability rules for autonomous systems                  | UN Secretary-General; raised across plenary and thematic sessions    | 5      | Assigns cost to harm, changing developer incentives at source; reaches safety, rights and weapons.    | Frontier labs and host states have no reason to concede it.             |
| NOT YET AGREED | Mutual recognition & interoperable governance standards              | EU (Viola); Microsoft (Brad Smith); Costa Rica; UN Secretary-General | 5      | Determines whether every other safeguard scales across borders or fragments into arbitrage.           | Industry and EU both want it; cuts against the sovereignty push.        |
| NOT YET AGREED | Pre-deployment evaluation standards for frontier models              | Scientific Panel (Bengio, Ressa); EU; UN Secretary-General           | 5      | Gates the highest-leverage agenda item; binds what developers must demonstrate before release.        | Contested; the Scientific Panel report gives it a baseline to build on. |

**Note:** Proposed solutions ranked by impact and progress status. Impact ranking is rhetorical. Sources: UN GA Res. A/RES/79/325; UN Global Dialogue site (Partnerships Hub); UN News and UNifeed (SG remarks); ITU thematic session report; UNESCO; EU statements; Independent International Scientific Panel first report (1 July); QNA (cybersecurity); Digital Watch; co-chairs.

## 2d. Stakeholder Perspectives and Priorities

- The submissions revealed a clear division between stakeholders concerned primarily with expanding participation in the AI ecosystem and those focused on governing the risks arising from it. Governments—particularly those from the Global South—placed greatest emphasis on the foundations required for meaningful participation: computing capacity, connectivity, skills, finance, institutional capability and access to applications. Their position suggested that global AI governance could not be separated from the unequal distribution of technological resources. For these actors, participation in rule-making had limited value unless countries also possessed the infrastructure and expertise needed to develop, evaluate and deploy AI systems themselves.
- Civil society, academia and the technical community approached the same landscape from different but overlapping directions. Civil-society organizations concentrated on the consequences of AI for rights, inclusion, accountability and access to redress, while researchers emphasized the evidence and evaluation systems required to identify and measure those consequences. Technical participants translated these concerns into operational requirements such as incident reporting, secure-by-design systems and open standards. The private sector’s focus on interoperability and legal certainty connected these discussions to commercial deployment, although its concern with regulatory consistency did not always imply support for stronger regulation. Taken together, the stakeholder positions showed broad agreement on the need for capacity, safety and coordination, but less agreement on who should bear their costs or accept binding obligations.

**Table 4: Stakeholder Groups & Dominant Concerns**

| Stakeholder group                 | Dominant concerns from the source base                                                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Governments                       | Capacity-building ranked first in the written submissions. Priorities included infrastructure, skills, access to applications, policy templates and development finance.         |
| Civil society                     | Safety, rights, accountability, inclusion, redress and protection for vulnerable groups were central concerns.                                                                   |
| Private sector                    | Interoperability, legal certainty, conditions for innovation, standards alignment and safety testing were recurring concerns.                                                    |
| Academia and scientific community | Evidence, evaluation, access to public-interest research, risk measurement and the Scientific Panel’s continuing role were central.                                              |
| Technical community               | Open standards, incident reporting, secure-by-design systems, evaluation methods and infrastructural resilience were emphasized.                                                 |
| Global South actors               | Access to computing resources, connectivity, institutional capacity, linguistic inclusion, support for participation and a meaningful voice in governance were recurring issues. |

Figure 3: Stakeholder Representation–Impact Matrix for AI Governance





Figure 4: Key Stakeholder Groups in AI Governance



### Stakeholder Perspectives and Priorities (contd.)

- The figures show that participation in AI governance remained strongest among actors with formal institutional authority or technical power. UN bodies, major governments, the European Union, the scientific panel and large technology companies were placed largely in the upper half of the matrix, indicating relatively strong representation. Yet several of these actors—notably Microsoft, Google, frontier AI laboratories, the United States, China and the EU—appeared on the less-affected side. The governance process was therefore weighted towards institutions that developed, regulated or coordinated AI, rather than towards communities that experienced its consequences most directly.
- The clearest representation gap appeared in the lower-right quadrant. Children and young people, civilians in conflict zones, and communities living near data centres were identified as highly affected but weakly represented. The two figures also exposed a distinction between representation of a group and participation by that group. UNICEF could speak about child protection, UN Women could raise gender concerns, and standards bodies could address low-resource languages, but this did not necessarily mean that children, women, linguistic communities or affected local populations had a direct role in the discussion. Developing countries and Smart Africa appeared to have achieved greater visibility, suggesting that the Global South had gained some institutional representation, although this remained concentrated in states and intermediary organizations rather than affected communities themselves.
- The repeated starred entries—El Salvador, Costa Rica, developing countries, Smart Africa, women and girls, and low-resource-language communities—appear in both the represented and underrepresented sections of the matrix. If this duplication is intentional, it may indicate that their representation differed depending on whether formal attendance or substantive influence was being measured. If not, the figure requires a legend or correction, because the same stakeholder cannot occupy both positions on the representation axis without an explanation. This ambiguity itself points to the central methodological question: whether “representation” meant presence in the room, the ability to speak, or actual influence over outcomes.

# Chapter 3: Our Contribution

## 3a. Strengthening Parliamentary Participation

- Effective AI governance requires strong and informed parliamentary participation. During the Global Dialogue, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) focused on how parliaments could help shape and oversee national AI strategies. Contributors emphasized that AI policy should advance sustainable development, produce measurable public benefit and remain grounded in democratic principles through parliamentary scrutiny and meaningful public engagement.
- Lord Uday Nagaraju, founder of AI Policy Labs and a member of the House of Lords, contributed to the side event, “Parliamentary Oversight for Increased Transparency and Accountability of AI,” convened by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), CPA and UNDP on the opening afternoon of the Dialogue. Aligned with Cluster 4 on human rights and human oversight, the session examined the institutional and technical capabilities parliaments would require to hold governments and AI developers accountable, as well as the support that could be provided through the Global Dialogue and its Independent Scientific Panel.
- Lord Nagaraju argued that parliamentarians needed training that would give them a baseline understanding of AI. In response to the concern that technological change was moving too quickly for legislators to keep pace, he made the opposite case: the speed of change made foundational knowledge more important, not less. Parliamentarians who understood the fundamentals would be better equipped to assess new developments, ask the right questions and design proportionate policy responses. Without that grounding, legislatures risked relying excessively on executive agencies and industry expertise, responding primarily to headlines or adopting measures too broad to address the underlying problem.
- This argument corresponded with the IPU’s assessment that the effects of AI were advancing faster than efforts by parliamentarians and the international community to understand and regulate them. It also supported the IPU’s April 2026 motion calling on parliaments to participate actively in international AI-governance processes and align domestic legislation with evolving international standards. Parliamentary capacity-building, in this context, was not simply a technical exercise; it was necessary to preserve democratic oversight as increasingly consequential decisions about AI moved towards executive agencies, technical bodies and private companies.
- Lord Nagaraju also participated as a panellist on international cooperation and inclusive global governance during the WSIS Forum’s High-Level Parliamentary Dialogue on Digital Governance, held on Friday, 10 July. The session was hosted by the ITU and convened in partnership with the IPU, CPA and UNDP. He additionally contributed to an IPU podcast recording, further advancing AI Policy Labs’ work on strengthening parliamentary capacity and democratic accountability in global AI governance.
- Insight from the written submissions indicate a cross-cutting theme: panelists want cooperation to continue beyond initial discussions and evolve into long-term partnerships. Lord Nagaraju’s point is key to this; if AI governance is to be made at a level that is resilient to day-to-day technological developments, it will require an understanding of the core technology.

# Lord Uday Nagaraju of Bloomsbury


Founder and CEO, AI Policy  
Labs

*At the UN AI Dialogue, Geneva  
July 6-7, 2026*



### 3b. Next Steps & Future Directions

- In the future, genuine co-design is needed to determine what we want the future to look like, otherwise we are optimising for an unclear goal. Panelists noted that there is a gap between what is being measured and what matters to society (e.g speed vs safety); while co-design would improve this, Seghrouchni warns against fixating on measurable metrics. Identifying a new way of quantifying or reporting the harms of AI on cognition and democracy would be useful. To do this, countries could take inspiration from Chile's neurorights.
- Finally, AIPL highlights the importance of establishing a baseline layer of understanding of AI among parliamentarians. While it is true that technology develops quickly, the only way to keep up with these developments is to understand their core. In the past, technology was simple enough that politicians did not have to know about it; even where it was complex, summaries were sufficient. Politicians now no longer have that privilege; technology has become integral to domestic and foreign policy. It has become integrated into our daily lives, raising significant questions over safety and guardrails. However, for these guardrails to be put in place in a way that achieves the intended outcome with minimal secondary effects, the design of the technology needs to be understood.





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